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1. introductory note
The object of this brief study is to point out the 
basic changes which have occurred—or presently 
occur—in the body of the rules of the Law of the 
Sea from the time of its first codification (1958)1 
until today, and to examine the causes of the 
considerable modifications that can be observed 
in the position of States in matters of sea policy. 
The student of that phenomenon is also presented 
with the opportunity to search into the more gen­
eral re-orientations which take place within the 
sphere of international relations and on their 
socio-political surface. Thus, the delimitation of 
the legal changes and of their causes may lead to 
certain conclusions which concern directly the fu­
ture evolution of inter-State relations and the pos­
sible modification in the correlation among the 
traditional political forces. In other words, the 
present radicalism in the Law of the Sea should 
not be simply considered as an isolated phenome­
non but should be given its full dimensions within 
the system of international relations presently 
under formation; this does not mean, of course, 
that one should overlook the particular circum­
stances and the limits suggested by the dynamics 
of the modifications in the Law of the Sea.
2. the basic changes in the Law of the Sea
a. The main concerns of the past
The Law of the Sea began to be shaped into a 
complete system of rules from the time of the 
Great Discoveries.2 This was the result of the
1. The Law of the Sea was codified in its greater part, by 
the four conventions which were adopted in 1958 (Geneva). 
After the lapse of a long period of preparation, by the Interna­
tional Law Commission, most of the countries of the interna­
tional community participated in the Conference of Geneva for 
the Law of the Sea, under the aegis of the United Nations. 
The legislative work in Geneva ended up with the adoption of 
those four conventions which partly incorporated in the field 
of written law the preexisting customary rules of the Law of 
the Sea and partly created new rules which had not, as yet, 
been accepted in the domain of customary law, through State 
practice. The four conventions of substantive law are: a. The 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone;
b. The Convention of the High Seas; c. The Convention on 
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas; d. The Convention on the Continental Shelf. See, 
Rozakis, C.L., The Law of the Sea as Developed through the 
Claims of the Coastal States (Athens: Papazisis Publishing 
Co. 1976).
2. Some elementary rules of the Law of the Sea existed, of 
course, even before the Great Discoveries. However, most of 
the customary rules were limited ratione materiae and ratione 
loci to fields concerning rights of coastal States in their neigh­
bouring seas and, basically, jurisdiction upon ships sailing in 
these adjacent areas. See, Fulton. T. W., The Sovereignty of 
the Seas (London, 1911).
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competition among States for the acquisition of 
access to the newly discovered lands. By pro­
viding the only efficient means of communication 
with those remote areas, the sea became a field 
of dispute and controversy, since domination 
upon it secured the monopolization of the vast 
riches of the new lands. The fight for supremacy 
among the main powers at the time (Britain, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) did not result in 
favouring any of them in particular since no one 
among them surpassed the others in strength so 
considerably as to be able to secure the exclusive 
use of the seas for her own profit. Consequently, 
the great maritime States were forced to seek a 
peaceful co-existence in the high seas1 and, there­
fore, to work out some rules of behaviour that 
might ensure for all of them the unobstructed 
communication in the seas.
Under those circumstances, the rules of the 
Law of the Sea began to be shaped on the basis 
of one main principle, namely the freedom of the 
(high) seas. According to that principle, except 
for one narrow strip of water which fell under the 
sovereignty of the coastal States (territorial sea), 
the sea was free to all States and for all possible 
uses. The principle of the freedom of the seas, as 
formed by its initial supporters, aimed at free 
navigation which was then the main concern.2
However, the evolution of things in the follow­
ing centuries and especially within the 19th and 
the beginning of the 20th centuries, increased the 
usefulness of the sea and led to the enlargement 
of the content and of the constituent elements of 
the principle of the freedom of the seas. The pos­
sibility of exploitation of marine resources—of the 
living organisms which can be found within the 
deep waters of the high seas—-increased as tech­
nology progressed, thus leading to the adoption of 
the freedom of fishing as a constituent element of 
the freedom of the seas. Still later, to these two 
initial principles came to be added, again as a re­
sult of technological progress, other principles 
such as the freedom of overflying the high seas, 
the freedom of installation of submarine cables 
and pipelines, the freedom of scientific research, 
of exploitation of the sea-bed,3 of waste 
discharge,4 etc.
1. As «High Seas» are considered the märine areas beyond 
the outward limits of the territorial sea, which constitute the 
area of the full sovereignty of à coastal State. See, however, 
for the emerging changes of this scheme, the new tendencies 
in the Law of the Sea, infra.
2. See the views of its main supporter, Hugo Grotius, in 
Fulton, T. W. (op. cit., footnote 2), 345 f.
3. The question whether the principle of the freedom of the
seas secured the freedom of exploitation of the sea-bed re­
sources, beyond the outward limits of the territorial sea, 
should be answered positively, in our view. The sea-bed and
That historically first phase in the modem Law 
of the Sea, in which the principle of the freedom 
of the seas was the corner-stone of all specific 
legal regulations, remained unaltered until the end 
of the second World War. It could be argued, of 
course, that already since the latter years of the 
period between the two wars the absolute charac­
ter of that principle had begun to be disputed 
both by State practice and by the theory of Inter­
national Law; the relative expansion of the ter-
its subsoil are rich in living and non-living resources. We may 
refer, for instance, to sponges and crustacean (for the living 
resources) or to manganese nodules and oil (for the non-living 
resources). From a practical point of view, the exploitation of 
the sea-bed started to take place within the nineteenth cen­
tury; while for the raw materials there was no interest at all, 
at that time, because there was no technical means to secure 
feasible methods of exploitation. Thus, the question of the ex­
ploitation of the raw materials of the sea-bed remained, to a 
great extent, quite theoretical for the. sea areas which were 
outside of the territorial sea. A part, however, of the doctrine 
[see, Gidel, Le Droit international public de la mer (Paris, 
1932-1934)] considered that the exploitation of the sea-bed 
beyond the territorial sea, was not permissible for any coun­
try, and that the only legitimate access to the sea-bed and its 
subsoil was through submarine tunels dug from the coasts or 
from within the territorial sea of a coastal State. Despite the 
extraordinarily theoretical character of this .subject, we would 
like to express our disagreement with that viewpoint. We be­
lieve that the freedom of exploitation of the sea-bed beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction (and with respect to the non­
living resources, since for the living resources there was no 
doubt that they were covered by the principle of the freedom 
of the seas) constituted—and constitutes—a substantive ele­
ment of the freedom of the seas. The fundamental principle of 
the freedom of the seas seems to be applicable ratione loci in 
all parts of the sea, extending to the air above, the sea sur­
face, the water column, the sea-bed and its subsoil and 
ratione materiae all the activities which may take place there, 
unless they are specifically excluded, and provided that they 
do not prevent the exercise of the rights of other States de­
riving from the precepts of that same principle. The fact that 
the exploitation of the sea-bed means, in substance, exclusive 
rights for the State which first enters the area, it should not 
be considered as violating the principle of the freedom of the 
seas. Certain other activities, as well (such as fishing by the 
means of permanent gear embedded on the seafloor), create 
relevant situations which are not prohibited by International 
Law. We believe that the principle of the freedom of the seas 
does not exclude occupation of specific areas of the sea; the 
only thing which is excluded by the principle is the acquisi­
tion, through occupation, of property rights amounting, in the 
field of International Law, to sovereignty.
4. For many years, particularly in the aftermath of the in­
dustrial revolution, the seas have been utilized as receptacle 
of waste from ships or coastal communities. In our days the 
uncontrollable use of the oceans has led to the pollution of 
large sea areas and caused serious damages to the sea life. 
Thus, since the early fifties some measures have been taken 
which aim at limiting the use of the seas as a waste recepta­
cle. We may argue that today the principle of the freedom of 
the seas does not cover, under its protecting aegis, the «right» 
of waste discharge and the pollution of the waters by ships or 
human communities. Those activities are regulated by a series 
of general and particular rules which determine the conditions 
of the waste discharge.
31
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 24/12/2020 01:37:32 |
’Επιθεώρηση Κοινωνικών ’Ερευνών, a τετράμηνο 1977
ritorial sea towards the high seas (at the latter’s 
expense), the creation or claim of new zones in 
areas of the sea which formerly were considered 
free—such as the contiguous and the fishery 
zones1—constituted the first blows to that princi­
ple. However, the priorities remained more or 
less the same during those years and the conflict 
between the interests of the coastal States and 
those of the aggregate of States (including, of 
course, the coastal States) was not so strong as 
to challenge in any way the principle of the free­
dom of the seas.
b. The new concerns
Immediately after the end of the Second World 
War one can notice a shift of interest among 
States with respect to the sea. Progressively and 
steadily the basic concerns which had supported 
the principle of the freedom of the seas 
(navigation and fishing) began to be substituted 
by a new interest, namely the exploitation of the 
raw-materials of the sea-bed.
Already since 1945, coastal States had pre­
sented the tendency to expand the limits of their 
sovereignty and jurisdiction towards the high seas 
in an effort of exclusive exploration and exploita­
tion of the sea-bed beyond the traditional territori­
al sea. The United States led the way in the cre­
ation of a complex (often contradictory) practice 
and laid the foundation, through the Truman 
Proclamation, of the expansionist tendency of the 
coastal States and of the acceptance of the notion 
of the continental shelf in the Law of the Sea.2 
The example of the United States was soon fol­
lowed by other States which proceeded, mainly 
by unilateral declarations, to the definition of new 
maritime areas through the expansion of the al­
ready existing territorial zones or through the 
creation of new «multi-functional» zones (hitherto 
unknown in the international field) or, finally 
through the acceptance of the new regime of the 
continental shelf which acquired a legal status for 
the first time.3
1. See Rozakis, C. L. (op. cit., footnote 1), 48 and 67 re­
spectively.
2. The Truman Proclamation points out that the government 
of the USA «regards the natural resources of the subsoil and 
sea-bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but con­
tiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to 
the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control... The 
character as high seas of the waters above the continental 
shelf and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are 
in no way thus affected...» (Proclamation No 2667, «Policy of 
the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of 
the Subsoil and Sea-Bed of the Continental Shelf», Sept. 28, 
1945. Fed. Reg. 12303, XIII Bulletin, Department of State, No. 
327, 1945.
3. These three methods of State practice has as a goal the
This manifold practice of States was to be mul­
tiplied during the decade of the fifties.But where­
as with respect to the claims of coastal States 
to maritime areas laying at a great distance from 
the coast and having a multi-functional character, 
practice was limited to the States of Latin 
America,4 the regime of the continental shelf was 
expanded to a much more considerable extent. 
The coastal States, without exception, acquired, 
through a general custom gradually increasing in 
strength, the exclusive right of exploration and 
exploitation of a part of the sea-bed which was 
called continental shelf. There still existed, of 
course, a certain confusion as to the precise 
limits and extent of the continental shelf as a 
legal notion. However, that regime had entered 
well into the sphere of law so that the questions 
related to it were of a rather marginal character.
Thus, the new situation which had been created 
since the end of the second world war consisted 
in the modification of the use of the seas through 
the important addition of the exploitation of the 
sea-bed and its subsoil (which was practiced be­
tween the two wars only in an elementary way) 
and in the resultant change in the hierarchy of the 
interests of States in the sea. Whereas in the past 
the interest of the international community had 
focused on communication—and rather inciden­
tally on exploitation (fishery)—,in the after-war 
years exploitation became, slowly but steadily, 
the chief concern. This shift of interest made it­
self manifest in the ever-increasing claims of the 
coastal States upon their neighbouring seas and in
expansion of the exclusive rights of the coastal States in their 
adjacent waters beyond the traditional limits of the territorial 
sea which did not exceed few miles from the coasts. Some 
States choose, as a method of expansion, the transposition of 
the limits of the territorial sea from 3-6 n. miles to considera­
bly greater distances from the coasts (for some of them the 
distance reaches 200 n. miles). By the adoption of this method 
they secure the desirable exclusive control of the resources, 
without running the risk of applying a totally new and unor­
thodox legal regime which might create doubts and problems 
to the rest of the States of the international community. Some 
other States try to impose new zones, beyond the limits of the 
territorial sea, which could have a «multifunctional» character 
(namely zones of jurisdiction over the exploitation, fisheries 
and navigation). These zones are instituted through internal 
decisions of a legislative character and ratione materiae are 
either totally new (such as the «maritime zone» of some 
States in Latin America) or traditional zones modified so as to 
contain satisfactory arrangements for the new exigencies (for 
instance the effort to differentiate the function of the contigu­
ous zone). Finally, a great number of States is aligned with 
the position adopted by the USA and proceeds to the accep­
tance of the new «single-functional» regime of the continental 
shelf, which eventually prevails over the other tendencies and 
arrangements. For a detailed discussion of these problems see 
Chapter First of the book of the writer (op. cit.).
4. See Rozakis, C. L. (op. cit.).
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their disregard of any possible influence of the 
new regimes on the freedom of communication;1 
it soon became so important as to render ques­
tionable the legal status which had been valid 
until then in maritime areas beyond the territorial 
waters, imposing upon States the need of a re­
examination of a great part of the orthodox Law 
of the Sea with the aim of creating a new balance 
between communication and exploitation.
The first Geneva Conference on the Law of the 
Sea (1958) which was convened under the aus­
pices of the United Nations aimed at creating a 
nefv legal status in the sea which might har­
monize the traditional law—and its accepted 
priorities—with the new concerns of the interna­
tional community. Thus began a parallel effort 
toward the codification of the customary Law of 
the Sea, on the one hand, and the creation of 
new rules on the rights of States on their neigh­
bouring seas, beyond territorial waters, on the 
other.
After a great deal of effort, the first Geneva 
Conference adopted four Conventions containing 
the greater part of the rules of the Law of the 
Sea concerning almost the aggregate of maritime 
inter-State activities.2
The Geneva Conventions on the Law of the 
Sea resolved all but two of the problems which 
had come to light with respect to inter-State rela­
tions and which had been put in the agenda for 
discussion: the question of the limits of the ter­
ritorial sea (its distance from the coast) and the 
question of the acceptance of an exclusive fishery 
zone beyond the territorial sea.
On these two points the first Conference was 
not able to give definite answers. For that reason, 
another Conference was convened in Geneva, in
1. The great maritime and fishing countries were against 
the original efforts made by States for the expansion of the 
coastal zones. Their opposition was obvious: any expansion of 
the coastal jurisdiction might influence, directly or indirectly, 
the freedom of navigation and the freedom of fishing. The in­
fluence was direct in the cases where the expansion trans­
formed the regime of high seas in a regime of national juris­
diction for those areas contained in the new regime (for in­
stance in the case of an expansion of the territorial sea to the 
high seas). The influence was indirect in the cases where the 
expansion of national jurisdiction to the high seas led to fac­
tual limitations of the freedom of the use of these seas by 
third States in the areas of the new regime, despite the legal 
assurance that the zones of specific jurisdiction do not affect 
the basic freedoms of inter-State communication. It is, indeed, 
extremely difficult for one to secure the unimpeded communi­
cation and fishing in sea areas whose bed is subject to tense 
exploitation: the real needs of exploitation of the sea-bed in­
fluence the freedom of supeijacent waters and impose limita­
tions which result from that exploitation upon the remaining 
freedoms.
2. See supra, footnote 1 for the Conventions adopted in
Geneva (1958).
1960, again without any positive results. The be­
ginning of the decade of the sixties were to find, 
therefore, the international community burdened 
with two pending important matters that had been 
left unsettled by* the first Geneva Conference. 
This was soon to agitate the relatively calm at­
mosphere that had prevailed after the codification 
enacted by the four Conventions adopted by the 
Conference.
It should be stressed, however, that the first 
Geneva Conference did not confront the problems 
that had emerged in the years after the war with 
the necessary insight. Most States did not foresee 
clearly enough the enormous importance of the 
sea as a future source of raw materials and man­
ifested a conservatism which did not correspond 
to the requirements of that particular historical 
moment.
The four Conventions which were adopted by 
the Conference, codified mainly the traditional 
Law of the Sea (which was based on the principle 
of the freedom of the seas) but hesitated to pro­
ceed to some necessary compromises that might 
resolve the conflict between the old and the new 
interests of States. In short, the Geneva Confer­
ence created a body of rules of law which, while 
reflecting the immediate interests of the great ma­
jority of the participant States at the moment (and 
especially of the great maritime and fishing 
interests) failed to make provision for the de­
velopments of the immediate future and to con­
ceive the gathering momentum of the exploitative 
tendency of coastal States in their neighbouring 
seas. Thus, the first Geneva Conference on the 
Law of the Sea confirmed once more the freedom 
of the seas in its essential constituent elements3 
and adopted the regime of the continental shelf 
through a special Convention which purported to 
regulate that matter as a whole.4 However, while
3. Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas provides 
that «[t]he high seas being open to all nations, no state may 
validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. 
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions 
laid down by these articles and by other rules of international 
law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal 
States: (1) Freedom of navigation, (2) Freedom of fishing; (3) 
Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; (4) Freedom 
to fly over the high seas. These freedoms and others which 
are recognized by the general principles of international law, 
shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the 
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the 
high seas ».
4. The Convention on the Continental Shelf contains both 
the definition of the term «continental shelf» and the methods 
of its delimitation as well as the specific rules which deter­
mine the relations of the coastal States (which have sovereign 
rights on the continental shelf) with third States using the seas 
over the shelf. Despite the fact that the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf constituted a real progress which dissipated, 
in those years (1958), the doubts over and the inconsistencies
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these two principles dominated thereafter the field 
of conventional law giving the impression that a 
successful compromise had been achieved, the 
particular provisions of the legal rules of the 
Conventions and the absence of a realistic coor­
dination among them did not contribute at all in 
the promotion of definite solutions.1
The spirit of indecision and the inadequacy 
which marked the Law of the Sea that emanated 
from the first Geneva Conference became evident 
even during the first years of application of the 
Conventions. In the beginning of the sixties the 
interest of the international community was 
turned to the direction of the sea resources, thus 
leading to an expansionist policy of States with 
regard to their rights in the sea, aiming at the ex­
clusive exploitation of the sea-bed. Indeed, most 
States began at that time to seek new ways to 
extend their jurisdiction in the high seas and to 
deviate from the principle of the freedom of the 
seas which was gradually becoming quite burden­
some.
Beyond, however, that exploitative tendency 
which carried away the traditional (as well as the
of the new legal regime, its text did not cover with success 
the central problem of the limits of the continental shelf. Arti­
cle 1, containing the general rule, provides: «For the purpose 
of these articles, the term 'continental shelf’ is used as refer­
ring (a) to the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas adja­
cent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to 
a depth of 200 metres or beyond that limit, to where the depth 
of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the 
natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the sea-bed and 
subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of 
islands». (The emphasis is ours). Article 6 of the same Con­
vention provides: «1. Where the same continental shelf is adja­
cent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are 
opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf ap­
pertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement be­
tween them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another 
boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the bound­
ary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant 
from the nearest points of the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured». The 
same rule applies, mutatis mutandis, for the delimitation of 
the continental shelf of two adjacent States (par. 2 of Article 
6).
1. We may consider as a failure of the Conference the fact 
that the legislative efforts did not succeed in regulating, in a 
detailed manner, to question of the dialectic «freedom of the 
seas»—«claims for exploitation beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction». The Geneva Conference did not accept the 
widening of the territorial sea to some reasonable new limits 
(for instance 12 miles) which, for some time, might have 
stopped the expansionist tendencies; it also refused to accept 
a fishing zone, beyond the territorial sea, which might have 
silenced the opposition of some States; it refused to take some 
rigid measures for the protection of the maritime environment. 
On the other hand, the Conference refused to guarantee the 
basic constitutive elements of the freedom of the seas by 
omitting a) to set out clear limits of the jurisdiction of the 
coastal States and b) to create a rigid legal hierarchy of rules 
giving, thus, prominence to the rules protecting the freedom of 
the seas.
recent) law in the adventure of a radical 
change—the main victim being the principle of 
the freedom of the seas—the international com­
munity began also to be concerned with the great 
problem of environmental protection.2 As human 
intervention in the maritime environment in­
creased with the lapse of time, the latter be­
coming more and more the garbage can of human­
ity, the sea water began to show the limits of its 
toleration: as a result of pollution or of unreason­
able over-exploitation, the living organisms of the 
sea began to die or to reproduce themselves less 
than they used to do before; the flora vanished in 
some parts of the sea and, generally, the biologi­
cal course of life began to lose its natural bal­
ance. Some seas entered into the dying process 
and the long-run consequences of such a 
phenomenon upon life on our planet were not 
hard to imagine. The tardy realization of the new 
great danger which threatened the earth forced 
the international community to seek out some ef­
ficient means of environmental protection and to 
create a special legal regime for the protection of 
the maritime space. The emergence of this new 
concern struck another blow on the principle of 
the freedom of the seas, which was soon trans­
formed into a legal reality through the taking of 
some very concrete measures by the international 
community to that effect.3
c. The fundamental changes
The multiple claims of States in the area of the 
high seas did not remain theoretical and abstract. 
During the decade as the sixties, a great number of 
States began to apply a practice with respect to 
the sea, which aimed at establishing new regimes 
of jurisdiction in their neighbouring waters or in 
the waters beyond their territorial seas. This prac­
tice was mainly expressed in the following ways:
A. Through the «creative» interpretation of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1958 (that is of those that 
had come into force) by the States which had 
ratified them.4 The Convention on the Continen­
tal Shelf, in particular, offered the possibility of 
expansion of the limits of exploitation of the 
coastal States through the elastic criterion of arti­
cle l.s Thus, the application of that Convention 
led to a gradual expansion of the limits of the 
continental shelf, something which certainly was 
not envisaged or foreseen by its drafters in 1958.
2. See supra, footnote 6.
3. These measures also affect the activities of States within 
the areas of (national) sovereignty or jurisdiction.
4. See, inter alia, Rozakis, C. L. (op. cit.), particularly 
Chapter 2.
5. Ibid.
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Other Conventions, too, such as the Convention 
on Fishing and the Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas, were applied as a 
pretext in order to confirm and corroborate the 
expansionist intensions of States in their neigh­
bouring waters and the sea-bed.
B. Through the abuse of rights granted by cus­
tomary regimes—not necessarily codified by the 
four Geneva Conventions—and the unilateral al­
teration of their content by some States. The 
more frequent «violation» of that character occur­
red in the case of the territorial sea which was 
sometimes extended to two hundred miles in 
order to serve the expansionist needs of States. 
Within the same trend lay the effort of a qualita­
tive, this time, modification of the character of 
the traditional contiguous zone from a security 
zone of the coastal States to a zone of exploita­
tion of the living resources contained in its 
waters.1
C. Through the creation of conventional regimes 
among interested States aiming at the eradication 
of the constituent elements of the freedom of the 
seas. Such regimes principally concerned fishery, 
environmental protection and navigation and ac­
tually consisted in the allotment of sea areas, 
beyond the territorial sea, for those aims. Despite 
the fact that such conventions do not generally 
influence third States, their multiplication in re­
cent years has inevitably rendered legitimate 
many claims of coastal States to their neighbour­
ing seas. Through the method of «regional» 
agreements, which have prevailed in the field of 
the Law of the Sea in the last two decades, the 
resolution of local disputes has certainly been 
facilitated, but this practice resulted in the 
gradual weakening of the principle of the freedom 
of the seas in the areas where a regional agree­
ment created a regime of «vested» rights.2
D. Through the customary establishment of new 
zones of sovereign rights or simple jurisdiction. In 
the sixties, the practice of the States of Latin 
America led to the creation of a two-hundred mile 
zone which was named «patrimonial sea». The 
basic meaning of the patrimonial sea is that the 
coastal State enjoys the exclusive right of explo­
ration and exploitation of the resources of the 
sea-bed and its subsoil and of the living or­
ganisms which exist in the maritime areas which 
are contained in that zone.3
Under these circumstances and due to the mul­
tiplication of the number of incidents in the inter­
national practice, lying under the above examined
1. See, Rozakis, C. L. (op. cit.), particularly Chapter 2.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
categories, the system of law that had been estab­
lished by the four Geneva Conventions of 1958 
could not serve anymore the inter-State relations 
in the sea. It became evident that claims like the 
ones described in the previous lines, could no 
longer be considered as violations of the orthodox 
Law of the Sea but should acquire the character 
of legitimate acts through the acceptance, beyond 
the usual processes of custom, of a generally ac­
cepted multilateral convention.
The need of transformation of the unilateral, 
usually, acts of many States into a generally ac­
cepted law was certainly not intended simply to 
satisfy some newly developed claims; it sprang 
from the fact that the international community 
realized that a new international convention, 
created by a common law-making effort, would 
help to transform such claims (through the com­
promise involved in the process of creating gen­
erally accepted rules) so as to correspond to the 
demands of the international community as a 
whole and not only of those States which wished 
to impose the change.
The activities for convening a world Conference 
on the Law of the Sea reached their climax after 
the warm acceptance of Malta’s proposition for 
the examination, through the United Nations, of 
the question of establishing an international re­
gime «beyond the areas of national jurisdiction» 
(1967).4 The ad hoc Committee which was 
created by the General Assembly was aimed at 
«examining the peaceful uses of the sea-bed 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction».5 The 
Committee, however, soon detected the inters 
dependence of all maritime problems and the 
need of a more general reformulation of the Law 
of the Sea so as to become conformable to the 
claims of States and their practice. Thus, the 
work of the Organization was transposed from the 
level of the problems related to the sea-bed of the 
high seas to that of a comprehensive re­
examination of the Law of the Sea. The creation 
of three Committees6 purported to study separate 
aspects of that subject-matter marked the be­
ginning of the preparatory stage of an internation­
al Conference on the Law of the Sea in which 
States would be given the opportunity to legislate 
the rules of that law as they thought best.
The Third Conference on the Law of the Sea 
began to convene in sessions under the auspices 
of the United Nations from the end of 1973.7 
The special characteristic of those sessions was
4. Ibid.. 258-259.
5. UN Resolution 2340 (XXII), December, 18, 1967.
6. See, Rozakis, C. L. (op. cit.) 271 et seq.
7. Ibid., 211 et seq.
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that, for the first time, legislation took place 
mainly on the «backstage» through unofficial 
Committees or groups of States in which the var­
ious interests were represented.1 At the end of 
every session, the President of each Committee 
presented the legal texts containing the drafts of 
rules of law accompanied by introductory notes 
which exposed the conclusions drawn from the 
various discussions during the session.
Judging from the work accomplished up to the 
present day, it could be maintained that the Third 
Conference has brought about the acceptance of a 
number of draft articles which set out the func­
tion of the most important maritime regimes. The 
general regime which is being shaped includes 
one area in which coastal States exert their 
sovereignty or jurisdiction and another one, out­
side the limits of national jurisdiction, the surface 
of which is free while the sea-bed belongs to the 
international community of States as a whole.
More specifically, the basic regimes'which are 
being created by the Conference are:
A. Within the limits of national juris­
diction
(a) The territorial sea, where coastal States 
enjoy absolute sovereignty and which extends up 
to twelve miles from the coast.2
(b) The contiguous zone, which remains a zone 
of security for coastal States, as it used to be in 
the past.3
(c) The continental shelf which is freed from all 
legal uncertainties of its past through the accep­
tance on the part of the legislators of its new 
outward limits. These are located at the point 
where the continental margin ends (and the ocean 
abyss begins) or at a distance of two hundred 
nautical miles from the baselines in cases that the 
outer edge of the continental margin does not 
reach that distance.4
(d) The exclusive economic zone, which is the 
real legislative novelty of the Third Conference 
and has been accepted by the totality of States, is 
an area extending two hundred miles from the 
outer limit of the territorial sea, in which the 
coastal State has jurisdiction as well as the almost 
exclusive use of the maritime space embraced by 
that zone. More precisely, the coastal State has 
the exclusive right of exploration and exploitation 
of all resources existing within the exclusive 
economic zone, including the sea-bed and its sub­
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., 292 et seq.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
soil. The parallel obligations of the coastal States 
to third States or to the international community 
as a whole do not impair in any substantial way 
the importance of their jurisdictional rights. Actu­
ally, under this new regime coastal States acquire 
the undisputed control over forty per cent of the 
sea of our planet.5
B. Beyond the limits of national juris­
diction
Beyond the outward limit of the exclusive 
economic zone—or, in some cases, the outward 
limit of the continental shelf—6 begin the high 
seas where, as can be seen in the draft articles of 
the Third Conference, still prevails the principle 
of the freedom of the seas. However, a regime is 
created even here, which clearly influences the 
freedom of the seas both directly, that is, in its 
constituent elements of exploration and exploita­
tion of the sea-bed and indirectly, namely through 
the very character of the restriction which is le­
gally imposed: the Third Conference on the Law 
of the Sea favours the creation of a regime, called 
Common Heritage of Mankind, which offers to 
the international community as a whole the exclu­
sive right of exploration and exploitation of all 
the resources that can be found on the surface of 
the sea-bed and its subsoil. Independently of what 
kind of regulation will finally prevail with respect 
to the method of exploration and exploitation, the 
output will be distributed to all States of the in­
ternational community in proportions favouring 
the developing countries.7 This new regime, 
which will drastically influence the principle of 
the freedom of the seas in the long run, com­
pletes the exploitative trend which came to light 
in the after-war as a result of the new orienta­
tions and needs of the international community of 
States.
In concluding, at this point, on the positions 
which were analyzed in the previous lines, it 
should be admitted that the principle of the free­
dom of the seas—representing a historical stage in 
which free communication was humanity’s main 
concern—has been seriously suppressed. This has 
been brought about in two ways: first, the free­
dom of the seas no longer applies to the forty per 
cent.of the total maritime space which has lost 
the character of high seas. Here, the freedom of 
the seas has been substituted by several separate 
obligations of the coastal States to respect naviga-
5. See, Rozakis, C. L. (op. cit.).
6. In the cases where the outer edge of the continental 
shelf of a Suite lies beyond the 200 mile distance from the 
coast.
7. See, Rozakis, C. L. (op. cit.).
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tion, overflying and communication in general. 
Second, in the sixty per cent of the total maritime 
space where the freedom of the seas is still 
theoretically valid, it is actually restricted to 
communication and fishing. Its former constituent 
elements are, in this case, simply nominal and the 
probability of their survival is, at least in the long 
run, extremely low. The development of explora­
tion and exploitation in the large maritime space 
which constitutes the common heritage of man­
kind will certainly alter the priorities so that the 
freedom of the seas will be determined in the fu­
ture according, each time, to the actual material 
needs of the international community. It should 
be stressed, at this point, that the concern of en­
vironmental protection and of the conservation of 
the living resources of the sea will also influence 
the remaining constituent elements of the freedom 
of the seas; indeed, the Third Conference has al­
ready paved the way in that direction.
3. the sociopolitical understructure of the changes 
in the Law of the Sea
The changes that have occurred in the body of 
the Law of the Sea must be mainly attributed to 
two basic factors: the numerical increase of the 
members of the international community (which 
has also resulted in a qualitative change) and the 
multiplication of the needs of the aggregate of 
States which helped by technological progress fo­
cus their interest on the new sources of goods.
a. The appearance of new States
In the Geneva Conference on the Law of the 
Sea in 1958, State participation did not exceed 
the number of one hundred and seventy.1 That 
number indicated both the breadth of the interna­
tional community at the time—given that its 
greater part was represented in Geneva—and the 
degree of interest of the States which participated 
in the Conference.
Since 1958, however, States have multiplied in 
number and their interest in an active participa­
tion in the processes, political and other, which 
are related to law-creation, has also increased.
A. The multiplication of States
At the end of the 19th century and the be­
ginning of the 20th, the international community 
consisted of only a few independent States, most 
of them being in Europe and in America. The
I
I. UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (A/CONF.
13/37).
peoples of Africa and Asia, in their greater part, 
did not enjoy national sovereignty and indepen­
dence but were under the colonial yoke of the 
Europeans and the American States.
The decolonization of Africa and Asia begins 
after the end of the first World War.2 Between 
1920 and 1939, there is a moderate and hesitant 
granting of independence by Europeans in some 
parts of the world. Decolonization gains a great 
impetus in Africa and Asia after the end of the 
Second World War and reaches its climax during 
the fifties and the sixties. Today, in 1977, the 
number of areas which are still under a regime of 
subjection has been drastically reduced.3
The States which have emerged as a result of 
the decolonization are numerous. Over eighty 
States have appeared on the map of Africa, Asia, 
Latin America and the Pacific Ocean, whether 
purely ethnocentric or connected by loose na­
tional ties mainly through the criterion of geo­
graphical location. Within a short time, those 
States have formed an important majority which 
has overturned the correlation among the political 
forces of the international community. Moreover, 
the new States are beginning to become aware of 
their numerical importance, of the dependence of 
the industrialized world on their natural wealth 
and of the need to form alliances among them so 
as to render their majority strong enough to exert 
the pressure which is necessary for the promotion 
of their demands.
The proper evaluation of this change in the in­
ternational majority is of an extreme interest. In 
the last years, the international community has 
functioned on the basis of the majority principle 
which has determined an important part of its de­
cision process. Despite the fact that the great 
powers have always played a significant political 
(and often legally established)4 role in interna­
tional decisions, especially in the ones that were 
of great weight for the political future, the major­
ity system has been used as a means of decision­
taking in most international organs which have 
been created by the international community in 
the last years, in most international conferences 
and, generally, in most of the manifestations 
which expressed, or simply indicated, the will of 
States vis à vis the problems of the community 
and their resolution.
However, the majority system was established
2. See, Tenekides, Public International Law (Ä 1975), 
especially 119 et seq.
3. See, Calogeropoulos-Stratis, Le Droit des Peuples à dis­
poser d'eux-mêmes (1973), 293 et seq. and tables, 349 et seq.
4. See for example the case of articles 23-32 of the Charter 
of the United Nations.
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at a time when the correlation among political 
forces was different than it is today. Indeed, it 
was established when the developed Western 
world still enjoyed a certain unity and 
homogeneity;1 when the common historical, 
cultural and political background allowed for a 
common, at least, perception of a problem. Al­
though the international community has never in 
its history known a stage of a really peaceful 
cooperation, alterations and disputes among inde­
pendent States had had for a long time the 
character of a «family affair», a fact which per­
mitted, at times, a co-existence which was based 
on reason because it was commonly orientated. 
Shortly after the end of the Second World War, 
that conception of common goals had led, very 
briefly, to an optimism concerning survival in a 
world left in ruins by the catastrophic urge of un­
controllable interests. In that spirit, there were, 
indeed, some concessions made in the name of 
«social» welfare. The majority system which was 
accepted in the international decision process was 
among those concessions.
That conception of common goals was naturally 
dissipated with the entrance of the new States in 
the international community in the last two de­
cades. There have been two reasons for that: on 
the one hand, the new States come from geo­
graphical areas where other civilizations, bearing 
almost no resemblance to the Western civiliza­
tion, have grown. The mentality, the way of life, 
the value system, even the mode of expression 
which prevail in those parts of the world differ 
substantially from those of the Western countries, 
especially of Europe and America. Thus, the 
common background on which international coop­
eration had rested is lacking from the enlarged in­
ternational community of our days, a fact which 
renders even more difficult the solution of the 
various problems which are, of course, them­
selves highly complex.
On the other hand, beyond those cultural and 
psychological factors, there are purely political 
considerations which contribute to the modifica­
tion of the co-existence image. It could be main­
tained that the predominant characteristic of the 
new States, as opposed to the old world, is their 
deep mistrust for the intentions of the latter. 
They are still under the influence of their colonial 
origin, their long submission to today’s developed 
States. They cannot too easily forget the condi­
tions of their previous relationship with them. 
Their natural wealth had become for centuries the 
object of an insatiable exploitation; the same was
1. See, Goodspeed, The Nature and Function of Interna­
tional Organization (1967), 76 et seq.
true of the indigenous peoples themselves who 
completed the needs of the white men through 
their work and services. It should not be surpris­
ing, therefore, that the States of Africa and Asia, 
in their great majority, are so mistrustful of the 
industrialized world, to the extent of avoiding, as 
much as possible, any offer of economic and 
technical aid that might seem to conceal some 
sort of exploitative intention of a «neo-colonial» 
character.
The acquisition of the numerical majority by 
the new States had, therefore, as a result the dis­
turbance of the delicate balance of the interna­
tional system, thus becoming one of the most 
serious political and legal problems of our times. 
The States of the old world are unable to re­
modify the majority system since the process of 
any change is trapped within this very same sys­
tem. This has obliged them to concentrate their 
efforts towards other solutions which, though 
functioning within the majority system, might 
nevertheless contribute in making it more 
elastic.2 However, for the time being, the 
international community accepts the majority sys­
tem in many of its legislative activities, and this 
greatly helps the acceptance and adoption of the 
views and the legal convictions of the new States.
B. The interest of the new States in the 
modificatiòn of International Law
Although the decolonization of Africa and Asia 
had started early in our century, the presence of 
the new States did not make itself felt on the 
level of international relations but in the last few 
decades; it did not start influencing international 
decisions until the sixties. This has been so be­
cause, first, the numerical majority was com­
pleted only within that decade; and secondly, the 
full awareness of the new States regarding their 
common interests and their decision to proceed to 
the creation of a common front concerning some 
fundamental political and legal matters came, of 
course, much later than the proclamation of inde­
pendence in most of them.
The community of the positions of the new 
States is mainly due to the community of their 
concerns. Beyond the fact that they all share the 
same experience of past suppression, which ties 
them with a link of affinity, they also have the 
same or similar problems in their relations with
2. Recently there has been an effort for the modification of 
the majority principle and the transference of the voting prin­
ciples on the level of the importance of the States which vote, 
of the silent consent of others, etc. See, among others, Sohn, 
«Voting Procedures in United Nations Conferences for the 
Codification of International Law» 69 A. J. I. L., 310 (1975).
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the industrialized countries. The geopolitical 
image of the world today actually presents a 
polarization between the developed, industrialized 
Northern hemisphere and the under development 
Southern hemisphere. The North comprises 
Europe, North America and a part of Asia while 
the South embraces Africa, Latin America, 
Oceania and a part of Asia.1 The industrialized 
North depends, for its welfare, on the exploita­
tion of the natural resources of the developing 
South, while the latter depends, for its economic 
growth, on the reduction, as much as possible, of 
the profits of the industrialized North. This sim­
plified scheme explains quite clearly the extent of 
the disagreements and conflicts existing between 
the two worlds.
If the alliance of the Southern hemisphere is to 
succeed not perhaps in imposing its views but, at 
least, in bringing about a certain balance in the 
satisfaction of claims between itself and its 
Northern counterpart, it must proceed, above all, 
to an effort of modification of the legal frame­
work which presently prevails in our world. The 
network within which international relations pres­
ently function is so constructed as to favour the 
States of the old world, since, after all, it was 
first invented and established by the latter. The 
same is true of the state of law: an important part 
of the rules of International Law has been 
adopted to serve the interests of the great powers 
or, generally, of the developed States. Under 
such a regime, the new States seem to have little 
or no hope of satisfying some of their claims.
Consequently, the new States are presently en­
gaged in a struggle for the modification of the 
legal understructure of the international commu­
nity. With respect to the rules of International 
Law, their position comprises two basic priorities: 
first, the modification or the abolition of interna­
tional customary rules of general application 
which are harmful to their interests. These rules 
had been created as a result of the practice of the 
developed States at a time when the new States 
were not in a position to express their opinio juris 
since they did not enjoy an international per­
sonality.2
The position of the new States with respect to 
those rules is not uniform. They have not all be­
come an object of contest on their part. 
Moreover, they have accepted some of them in
1. Japan, South Corea. Taiwan (Nationalist China) and Au­
stralia should be placed in the category of the industrially de­
veloped States of Asia and Oceania.
2. The colonies of the European and American States did 
not enjoy an international personality or autonomous interna­
tional relations. The latter were carried out by the States of
Europe or America. See Tenekides, op. cit.. 114 et scq.
their relations with other States. At the same 
time, they try to abolish some others or to adopt 
them to the new image of the international com­
munity. What they insist upon, however, is the 
avoidance of application of international custom­
ary rules on the basis of the criterion of «general 
application».3 In other words, a great number of 
new States does not accept the traditional con­
ception of the old world that a customary rule is 
generally applicable (that is, applicable to the in­
ternational community of States as a whole) if it 
is sufficiently proved that it has been accepted by 
the practice of the great majority of States. The 
new States are of the opinion that a customary 
rule of law applies to a State only if there is suf­
ficient proof that this particular State has ac­
cepted the rule in its practice.
The second priority in the position of new 
States with respect to the rules of International 
Law is closely related to the first. Being more 
generally opposed to customary law, they would 
like to see conventional law becoming the pri­
mary process of international legislation. Their ef­
forts concentrate, therefore, on the one hand, on 
the codification of customary International Law, 
which may transfer the vague and often con­
tradictory customary rules into the field of posi­
tive law. Codification offers the additional advan­
tage of allowing the new States to intervene dur­
ing the process of transcription in order to modify 
or, at least, to attempt to modify the legal content 
of the rule. Thus, in an indirect way, the new 
States are trying to reformulate the rules which 
were created before they entered the international 
scene and to adapt them, as much as possible, to 
their own interests and goals.
On the other hand, beyond the codification of 
unwritten law, which aims at the gradual weaken­
ing of the customs of the past, the new States 
(backed by a number of the old States, especially 
from the socialist world) seek the establishment 
of the convention as the exclusive tool of future
3. By the term «general application» we mean the applica­
tion of a rule of International Law (customary or 
conventional) by a great number of States, which indicates its 
general acceptance by the international community to an ex­
tent allowing the assertion that there is a general consent of 
all States to its application. The problem which certainly 
arises—and which is intensively discussed by theory 
—concerns the exact terms on which a rule may be consider­
ed as satisfactorily covering the criterion of general applica­
tion. See. inter aliu, Briggs, «The Colombian-Peruvian Asylum 
Case and Proof of Customary International Law» 45 A.J.I.L.. 
728 (1951); D'Amato. The Concept of Custom in International 
Law (1971). especially 17-168; Kunz, «The Nature of Custom­
ary International Law» 47 A.J.I.L.. 662; Ro/.akis. «Treaties 
and Third States; A Study in the Reinforcement of the Con­
sensual Standards of International Law» 35 Z.a.ö.R.V. 1 
(1975).
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 24/12/2020 01:37:32 |
’Επιθεώρηση Κοινωνικών ’Ερευνών, a τετράμηνο 1977
legislative activity in international legal relations. 
It should be stressed, at this point, that in this 
particular effort the new States are assisted by a 
fact which, objectively, has orientated Interna­
tional Law towards the convention as the most 
appropriate method for the creation of legal rules, 
both general and particular; namely the fact that 
contemporary international relations have become 
so complex and technical that they require an in­
ternational legislation able to give detailed, im­
mediate and clear solutions to the problems that 
arise. International economic relations, or rela­
tions pertaining to environmental pollution or to 
the problems of the sea and the air can no longer 
be regulated by general and ambiguous rules of 
behaviour of customary law. What is required is 
an unequivocal and precise legal process offering 
to each question a concrete answer and deter­
mining, beyond any doubt, the extent and the 
limits of the rights and obligations of States in 
their inter se relations.
Within the context of the activity which tends 
to the abolition of the customary rules of the past 
and to the participation of new States in the crea­
tion of a new International Law, is included the 
revision of the rules of the Law of the Sea 
which is presently taking place through a series of 
legislative actions within the framework of the Un­
ited Nations or under jts auspices. Moreover, in the 
case of the Law of the Sea there is also a tendency 
for the revision of rules that had recently been 
codified (1958) and not simply of the general custom­
ary rules created at a former stage.
The effort for the revision of the Law of the 
Sea by the new States—as well as by other 
States, as already mentioned—is part of a more 
general endeavour undertaken by them for the 
modification of the international economic order. 
That effort is not caused by any expansionist or 
chauvinist tendencies or by any emotional hostil­
ity to the old maritime powers (which often coin­
cide with their ex-colonialist masters). On the 
contrary, their criteria are almost entirely based 
on their common belief in the need of a change in 
the correlation among the economic forces of the 
world. From the moment that they began to gain 
consciousness of the impact of their presence in 
the international field on account of the impor­
tance of their land and sea resources, and of the 
force of the unity of their claims, they im­
mediately began to seek to impose some changes 
to the edifice of economic relations.
The main goal of the new States is not a mere 
participation in the economic processes of the 
world under the same conditions which apply to 
the developed States. They realize perfectly well 
that such a solution would be fair only in appear­
ance. In a system of economic transactions in 
which the weaker party enjoys the same rights 
with the stronger one, the latter is likely to totally 
absorb and exhaust the former within a very 
short interval. Thus, the new States aspire to 
something more than equality, namely to the cre­
ation of favourable conditions on their behalf 
through the taking of concrete measures by the 
international community. They ask for the crea­
tion of a new economic order in which the 
economically less favoured States will enjoy some 
privileges which will help them to develop as fast 
as possible and to approach the level of the in­
dustrialized States.
It should be, noticed, at this point, that it is 
from this basic idea that derives its existence the 
«International Law of Development»,1 presently 
under creation, which aims at setting out a new 
structure for the legal framework of International 
Law, one that would help bring about the 
changes that are necessary for establishing a sys­
tem favourable to the developing countries. In 
this spirit of keeping pace with the demands of 
the new States (which have been expressed quite 
eloquently in the recent U.N. resolution 
under the title «Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States»)2 many fields of International 
Law begin to change. The more immediately af­
fected is, of course, the Law of the Sea since, 
like International Economic Law, it constitutes a 
field in which the legal rule is usually connected 
with economic interests.
Besides, however, economic interests stricto 
sensu, the position of the new States is also de­
termined by some other concerns which are in 
need of protection, or demand satisfaction, and 
which are connected, more or less, with corre­
sponding economic rights. Environmental protec­
tion and strategic problems belong to this cate- 
gory.
Concerning environmental protection, the posi­
tion of new States is not very clear since they are 
faced, in this respect, with a contradiction which 
is also felt, though to a lesser degree, by indus­
trialized States. The need of technological and in­
dustrial development of States of the Southern
1. See Institut Universitaire (Genève), Les Résolutions dans 
la Formation du Droit International du Développement (1971).
2. See, for activities in this field, inter alia, UNGA 
«Declaration the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order» [A/RES/3201 (S-VI) of 9th May 1974] and 
UNGA «Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order [A/RES/3202 (S-VI) of 16th 
May 1974. In the 13 I.L.M. 715 and 720 respectively (1974)]. 
For the «Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States», 
see UNGA [A/RES/3281 (XXIX) of 15th January 1975. In 14 
International Legal Materials 251 (1974) where also is found 
the text of the resolution.
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hemisphere inevitably leads to a destruction of 
the physical environment and to an increased in­
difference to the fate of nature. The new States 
are presently in the extremely difficult position of 
having to constantly keep an accelerated pace of 
development so as to reach soon the level of in­
dustrialized States; while lacking,, on the other 
hand, the strong economic means needed for that 
purpose. Consequently there is for them little 
room left for some policy of environmental pro­
tection. Such a policy would be a luxury which 
would reduce the intensive use of their resources 
as well as the economic profits from the latter’s 
exploitation. Environmental protection today re­
quires very important economic sacrifices that the 
new States cannot afford. Thus, for the time 
being, their policy on this issue remains elemen­
tary and does not, certainly, constitute a deter­
mining factor of their policy of economic growth.
Although, however, new States follow the same 
track that had in store so many unpleasant ex­
periences for the industrialized States, without 
re-examining their own course on the basis of 
those experiences, the demand of environmental 
protection is gradually becoming a negotiating 
weapon in their hands at the expense of third 
States which either try to penetrate their neigh­
bouring seas or carry out activities which are 
harmful to environment.
Indeed, one of the main arguments of new 
States for the exclusion of third States from their 
neighbouring seas is precisely the concern of pol­
lution and the conservation of maritime resources 
which are endangered by over-exploitation. Both 
the above issues are within the spirit of environ­
mental protection. Moreover, the new States have 
sought the extension of their sovereignty, or of 
their sovereign rights, beyond their territorial 
waters, or the extension of their territorial waters, 
using, inter alia, the argument of environmental 
protection. The significance of this practice 
should not be underestimated. Although there is, 
admittedly, an element of pretext in their present 
position, the fact remains that such policies are 
likely to lead them, sooner or later, to the accep­
tance of the principle of environmental protection 
as a result of international obligations which they 
would not be able to deny having themselves re­
sorted so frequently to that same principle. Con­
sequently, the new States will conform to the 
demands of environmental protection much 
sooner than the industrialized States did, which 
only after a hundred and fifty years of destruction 
of their natural environment began to realize the 
need of its protection.
With respect to strategic interests it suffices to 
mention that the modem development of massive
means of destruction has permitted the installa­
tion of weapons of great range on the soil of the 
sea-bed. The advantages of the use of the sea-bed 
for war purposes are obvious: the huge expanse 
of the sea which covers the greater part of our 
planet offers to the great powers the possibility 
of installing military bases in any part of the 
earth. Actually, to almost every strategic target 
corresponds a part of the sea from where that 
target may be attained. Another advantage of the 
use of the sea-bed is the relative safety of the 
submarine bases, since obviously enough, they 
are difficult both to detect and to destroy.1
For all the above reasons, the claims (of 
sovereign rights) with regard to the sea-bed for 
the installation of military bases enter the scene 
and join the already discussed claims of economic 
nature. However, whereas in the case of 
economic claims the demands of most States 
cover only the right of exploitation of the sea-bed 
and its subsoil, in the case of the strategic claims 
there seems to be a tendency to ask for an exten­
sion of sovereign control on the superjacent wa­
ters. That is not difficult to explain: it would be 
hard for a military installation to operate on the 
sea-bed and to be protected from the enemy 
without being controlled from the surface on a 
permanent basis. Consequently, the undisturbed 
and efficient operation of such an installation 
could be assured only through the sovereign con­
trol of its superjacent waters by the State-owner 
of the base.
Thus, one more reason is added to the already 
existing reasons of the restriction of the freedom 
of the seas. The demand of some States for the 
extension of their sovereignty on the sea which is 
superjacent to their submarine bases—for the in­
stallation itself no problem arises since the free­
dom of the seas offers this right to the «first 
occupant»—2 leads to ever increasing demands 
by other States for the acquisition of as large as 
possible portions of the seas for the same pur­
poses.
The position of new States with regard to the 
issue of strategic bases is negative. For them, the 
installation of such bases does not constitute a 
priority. Consequently, their opposition both to 
the installation of, and to the acquisition of 
sovereignty over, submarine bases is not in con­
flict with their immediate interests. The principle 
aim of the new States in this respect is to ex­
clude, as much as possible, the installation of 
strategic bases near their coasts through the ex­
tension of their own sovereignty on large portions
1. Friedmann, The Future of the Oceans (1971), 50 et seq.
2. Supra, footnote 5.
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of their neighbouring seas. However, on the basis 
of the Law of the Sea presently in force, they 
may prohibit the installation of such bases only 
within the area of their continental shelf accord­
ing to the accepted view that all activities of 
foreign military powers on the sea-bed which is 
exploited by, and is under the sovereignty of, a 
coastal State may harm the sovereign rights of 
the latter on its continental shelf.1
b. The multiplication of the needs of the enlarged
international community
Although it could be asserted without any re­
servation that the efforts for the creation of a 
new economic order are owed almost exclusively 
to the initiative of the new States, the same is not 
true of the «new» Law of the Sea. Indeed, it 
would be oversimplifying to maintain that only 
the new States wish to see some changes in that 
Law. It would be more accurate to assert that the 
emerging modification of the regime of the free­
dom of the seas is the outcome of the merging 
tendencies of the aggregate of coastal (but not 
only the coastal) States, which support such a 
modification for various reasons. Sometimes these 
reasons are diametrically opposed; but the final 
aim, which is to restrict or abolish some of the 
constituent elements of the freedom of the seas as 
well as the methods used to that effect, are more 
or less the same.
Thus, to the group of the new States one 
should add a great number of the developed 
States of Europe, North America, Australia and 
part of Asia, which seek in the sea the resources 
that are necessary for the satisfaction of their 
needs.
Certainly there is nothing new in maintaining 
that modem civilization has been entirely based 
on a constant amelioration of the conditions for a 
materially richer life; and that in their frenzied 
course for the conquest of material wealth, the 
States of the industrialized world drew prodigally 
from the existing resources of the earth, their 
prodigality sometimes deriving from their inability 
to use their resources in a rational way. At the 
same time, the consumer’s society began to 
create, through a vicious circle, a multiplication 
of needs: the satisfaction of one need led to the 
birth of another. The multiplication of needs, in 
its turn, led to a corresponding increase in the 
consumption of the material natural wealth.
The consumption of raw materials, especially in 
the last fifty years, has led to a serious decrease
1. See Brown, Arms Control in Hydrospace: Legal Aspects
of the natural resources of the earth. Despite all 
efforts for .the substitution of some kinds of raw 
materia] (which are used today as basic industrial 
goods) by artificial or other natural products, the 
existing needs are still not satisfactorily covered. 
With the exception of atomic energy, no other 
sources have yet been found which might substi­
tute the existing ones without any sacrifices on 
the material level of life. On the other hand, the 
international techno-economic system is solidly 
built upon the exploitation of certain natural kinds 
of raw materials (e.g. iron, oil, etc.). Any change 
in its orientation inevitably meets with the im­
mense difficulties which are caused by economic, 
political, technical, even psychological factors.
The tardy realization on the part of the indus­
trial States of the gradual decrease of natural re­
sources and of the danger of their utter extinction 
in the not so remote future2 has led them to 
search into new fields in order to secure their un­
interrupted technological advance. Beyond their 
long-run efforts for achieving a painless re­
orientation of the economy towards other sources 
of energy, their short-run aims are (a) a more ra­
tional, thought-out use of the earthly goods and 
(b) the search for the discovery of raw materials 
in yet unexploited parts of the world. Conse­
quently, it is only too natural that their interest 
has focused on the sea-bed and its subsoil from 
the moment that, due to the technological prog­
ress, they began to discover that the resources of 
the seas are so immense that they may secure a 
very considerable prolongation of their industrial 
development.
It should be stressed, at this point, that the 
need of raw materials becomes even more press­
ing as the claims of the new States progressively 
add themselves to those of the developed coun­
tries. Indeed, it is a quite noticeable fact that 
while the existing resources of the earth were 
used until quite recently by a limited only number 
of States, which represented a small percentage 
of the total earth population, today the same re­
sources (meanwhile, of course, considerably 
reduced) are used to satisfy the needs of a greatly 
increased number of States. Beyond, that is, the 
natural, though rapid, increase of the earth’s 
population—which is especially felt in the de­
veloping areas—the acquisition of sovereignty by 
the former colonialist States has given great im­
petus to the planning of national development 
programs which necessitate, of course, the inten­
sive use of raw materials.
Thus, humanity is presently the witness of two
2. See Wenk, The Politics of the Ocean (1972), 6 et seq.
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phenomena which may determine its future and 
which are both related to the sea. These are: (a) 
A strong rivalry among the States of the interna­
tional community for the acquisition of the 
sources of raw materials, especially at those parts 
of our planet which seem to offer substantial 
hopes of exploitation and which had not been up 
to now under anyone’s sovereignty or jurisdic­
tion. In this struggle of economic predominance, 
the sea element is of a primordial importance. 
The change thus effectuated in the character of 
the sea, which from a means of communication 
and transportation has become a first rate source 
of raw materials, will undoubtedly be a determi­
nant factor of the more general political directions
Law of the Sea and its sociopolitical understructure
of States, which will, in turn, influence the final 
image of the Law of the Sea. (b) A gradual de­
terioration of man’s physical environment. This 
phenomenon has already been detected as one of 
the gravest dangers which menace the human 
species. The pollution of the air and sea, the de­
struction of life (either by over-exploitation or 
pollution) may signify, in a system of ecologie in­
terdependence, the end of all life on our planet. 
Consequently, the demand for the protection of 
the environment and for the conservation of all 
living organisms on which depends the delicate 
balance between the continuance of life or its 
final extinction, becomes now more imperative 
than ever.
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